MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION vs. SSANGYONG CORPORATION G.R. No. 170633 October 17, 2007

Facts:

MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products and one of its supplier Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.

On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter addressed to Gregory Chan, MCC Manager [also the President of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation], to confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel under a preferential rate of US$1,860.00 per MT. Chan, on behalf of the corporations, assented and affixed his signature on the conforme portion of the letter.

Because MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, the order for 220MT of steel was split into two,one for110MT covered by Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and another for 110MT covered by ST2-POSTS0401-2,both dated April 17, 2000.
            Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision on March 24, 2004, in favor of Ssangyong.

On appeal, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the ruling of the trial court, but absolving Chan of any liability. The appellate court ruled, among others, that Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F") were admissible in evidence, although they were mere facsimile printouts of MCC's steel orders

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the admissibility in evidence of the pro-forma invoices despite the fact that the same were mere photocopies of facsimile printouts.

Held:

The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, its IRR and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, at first glance, convey the impression that facsimile transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic documents because they are sent by electronic means. The expanded definition of an "electronic data message" under the IRR, consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law, further supports this theory considering that the enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." And to telecopy isto send a document from one place to another via a fax machine.

Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents.Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have anoriginal paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term "electronic data message."

Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law's definition of "data message," without considering the intention of Congress when the latter deleted the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." The inclusion of this phrase in the IRR offends a basic tenet in the exercise of the rule-making power of administrative agencies. After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance—an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress. Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax transmissions to be covered by the mantle of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, it could have easily lifted without a bit of tatter the entire wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law.

Incidentally, the National Statistical Coordination Board Task Force on the Measurement of E-Commerce,on November 22, 2006, recommended a working definition of "electronic commerce," as "[a]ny commercial transaction conducted through electronic, optical and similar medium, mode, instrumentality and technology. The transaction includes the sale or purchase of goods and services, between individuals, households, businesses and governments conducted over computer-mediated networks through the Internet, mobile phones, electronic data interchange (EDI) and other channels through open and closed networks." The Task Force's proposed definition is similar to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) broad definition as it covers transactions made over any network, and, in addition, it adopted the following provisions of the OECD definition: (1) for transactions, it covers sale or purchase of goods and services; (2) for channel/network, it considers any computer-mediated network and NOT limited to Internet alone; (3) it excludes transactions received/placed using fax, telephone or non-interactive mail; (4) it considers payments done online or offline; and (5) it considers delivery made online (like downloading of purchased books, music or software programs) or offline (deliveries of goods).

We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmissioncannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.

GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008

Facts:  

Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14^th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.

Issue:

Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the Senate’s website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.

Held:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."

ZALDY NUEZ, Complainant, vs. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, respondent. A.M. No. CA-05-18-P April 12, 2005

Facts:

Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service Commission (CSC).  The CSC ordered complainant’s reinstatement but a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case. Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, Nuez sought the assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004 after learning of the latter’s employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David. Nuez communicated to the respondent through telephone conversation and text messages. A week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the decision was in return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).

Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he had been jobless for a long time and August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion. Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for the money and to set up a meeting with her.  Upon learning that respondent’s offer of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.

On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at the 2^nd Floor of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg., the place where the entrapment operation was later conducted. Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and found positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money. She was later detained at the WPD Headquarters.

As evidence, complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the former’s pending case with the CA. 

Issue:

Whether or not the text messages may be admitted as evidence.

Held:

 The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:

"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ." 

In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import.  Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.

Complainant’s testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on the latter’s demand for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by the testimony of a disinterested witness, Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador who was present when the parties met in person.  Siringan was privy to the parties’ actual conversation since she accompanied complainant on both meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.

Respondent’s evidence was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and sister as well as an acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and complainant first met.  Respondent’s own testimony consisted of bare denials and self-serving claims that she did not remember either the statements she herself made or the contents of the messages she sent.  Respondent had a very selective memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were propounded by the Committee.

When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainant’s cellphone and which reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she did not remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant. 

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT OF APPEALS vs. CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS A.M. No. CA-05-20-P September 9, 2005 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-81-CA-P)

Facts:

Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163. On appeal, the case was assigned to the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423. Lagua, who was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City, filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail. Finding the petition well-taken, the appellate court issued a Resolution on October 9, 2003, directing him to post a P200,000.00 bond. Lagua’s bond was approved in a Resolution dated November 6, 2003, where the appellate court also directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was then brought to the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Maria Isabel M. Pattugalan-Madarang, for promulgation.

Irma Del Rosario, Utility Worker, noticed the Salud’s (clerk IV) unusual interest in the Lagua case. Salud had apparently been making inquiries whether the appellate court had already directed the issuance of an order of release in the said case and was initially told there was none yet. Due to his persistence, the records of the case were eventually found.  Atty. Madarang then directed the typing of the Order of Release Upon Bond, and to notify the mailing section that there were orders requiring personal service. At around 4:00 p.m., Salud then went to Atty. Madarang’s office and assisted in arranging and stapling the papers for release. He brought the said resolutions and other papers himself to the Mailing Section.

On November 7, 2003, the Salud went to the National Penitentiary to serve the resolution and order of release in the Lagua case. Salud left the prison compound at around 2:30 p.m.  In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced herself as Lagua’s relative. It was about 2:00 p.m. The caller asked her how much more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty. The caller also told Atty. Madarang that they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, where the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be given to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the respondent. Atty. Madarang then called the said court and asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Lagua’s relative. What transpired thereafter is contained in Atty. Madarang’s Affidavit dated December 8, 2003.

Justice Magtolis testified that Atty. Madarang reported having received a telephone call from the alleged relative of Lagua. She narrated that she gave the name "Arlyn" to the caller, and, thereafter, exchanged text messages with the respondent. Justice Magtolis instructed Atty. Madarang to continue communicating with the respondent and, if possible, to see it through a possible pay-off where a National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent would be asked to assist them. However, the entrapment did not materialize. Nevertheless, the court admitted the text messages as evidence and ruled against Salud.

Salud now claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not text messages may be admitted as evidence.

Held:

Text messages have been classified as "ephemeral electronic communication" under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and "shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof." Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:

… The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:

"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages … and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the [said rules], "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof … ." In this case, complainant who was the recipient of the said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.

EMMANUEL B. AZNAR vs. CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines) G.R. No. 164273 March 28, 2007

Facts:

Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard) issued by Citibank with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida, planned to take their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of increasing his credit limit to P635,000.00.

Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency in Indonesia (to purchase tickets to Bali) but the was not honoured for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash. He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards.

On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16474 and raffled to RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and prevented them from buying certain items in their tour. To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh. "G") with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his card in question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.

As a defence, Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its cancelled cards covering the period of Aznar’s trip.

On May 29, 1998, RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, through Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, rendered its decision dismissing Aznar’s complaint for lack of merit. The trial court held that as between the computer print-out presented by Aznar and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins presented by Citibank, the latter had more weight as their due execution and authenticity were duly established by Citibank. Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration this time through Judge Jesus S. De la Peña of Branch 10 of Cebu City, the court issued an Order granting Aznar’s motion. Thus, Citibank filed an appeal with the CA and its counsel filed an administrative case against Judge De la Peña for grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and incompetence, claiming among others that said judge rendered his decision without having read the transcripts. On January 30, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting Citibank’s appeal. Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA dismissed in its Resolution dated May 26, 2004. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Exh. "G" qualifies as electronic evidence following the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides that print-outs are also originals for purposes of the Best Evidence Rule hence, should not be excluded as evidence.

Held:

As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.

The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the document executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.

Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.

Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:

Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.

Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;

(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or

(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the "other evidence showing integrity and reliability of Exh. "G" to the satisfaction of the judge." The Court is not convinced. Aznar’s testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient to show said print-out’s integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific business address of the source of the computer print-out because while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not reflected in the print-out.

Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out was generated and how the said information could be relied upon as true. 

TERESITA G. NARVASA vs. BENJAMIN A. SANCHEZ, JR. G.R. No. 169449 March 26, 2010

Facts:

The parties to this case are employees of the Municipality of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya (the LGU). Petitioner Teresita G. Narvasa is a senior bookkeeper while respondent Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr. is the municipal assessor.

The instant case stemmed from three cases of sexual harassment filed separately against respondent by petitioner along with Mary Gay P. de la Cruz and Zenaida M. Gayaton, who are also employees of the LGU.

In her affidavit-complaint, De la Cruz claimed that, sometime in February 2000, Sanchez handed her a note saying, "Gay, I like you." Offended by respondent’s inappropriate remark, de la Cruz admonished him for giving her such a note and told him that she would give the note to his wife. Respondent then grabbed the note from her and tore it into pieces. However, this first incident was followed by a message sent to De la Cruz sometime in March 2002 in which he said, "Ka date ko si Mary Gay… ang tamis ng halik mo."

On the other hand, Gayaton narrated that, on April 5, 2002, respondent whispered to her during a retirement program, "Oy flawless, pumanaw ka met ditan" while twice pinching her upper left arm near the shoulder in a slow manner.

A few days later, Gayaton received a text message while she was passing respondent’s car in front of the municipal hall. The message said, "Pauwi ka na ba sexy?" Gayaton later verified through respondent’s clerk, Alona Agas, that the sender of the message was respondent.

On or about April 22 to 25, 2002, Gayaton received several messages from respondent stating: (1) "I like you"; (2) "Have a date with me"; (3) "Don’t tell to (sic) others that I told that I like you because nakakahiya"; (4) "Puso mo to pag bigay moto sakin, I would be very happy" and (5) "I slept and dreamt nice things about you."

Finally, as far as petitioner’s complaint was concerned, she asserted that, on November 18, 2000, during a field trip of officers and members of the St. Joseph Multi-Purpose Cooperative to the Grotto Vista Resort in Bulacan, respondent pulled her towards him and attempted to kiss her. Petitioner resisted and was able to escape the clutches of respondent to rejoin the group that they were travelling with. Respondent apologized to petitioner thrice regarding that incident.1avvph

Based on the investigation conducted by the LGU’s Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI), respondent was found guilty of all three charges by Municipal Mayor Marvic S. Padilla. On appeal, the CSC dismissed the appeal but modified Mayor Padilla’s order by holding respondent guilty of grave misconduct instead of grave sexual harassment. Respondent’s next recourse was to the CA which partially granted his appeal. The CA modified the CSC resolution, finding respondent guilty only of simple misconduct. Accordingly, the penalty was lowered to suspension for one month and one day.

Petitioner comes to this Court to appeal the downgrading of respondent’s offense to simple misconduct.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sanchez is guilty of grave misconduct.

Held:

Yes. Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional. Worse, the incident occurred months after he had made similar but subtler overtures to De la Cruz, who made it clear that his sexual advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts respondent committed against petitioner were much more aggressive, it was impossible that the offensive nature of his actions could have escaped him. It does not appear that petitioner and respondent were carrying on an amorous relationship that might have justified his attempt to kiss petitioner while they were separated from their companions. Worse, as petitioner and respondent were both married (to other persons), respondent not only took his marital status lightly, he also ignored petitioner’s married state, and good character and reputation.

We disagree with the CA that neither corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule attended the incident in question. RA 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, took effect on March 5, 1995. Respondent was charged with knowledge of the existence of this law and its contents, more so because he was a public servant. His act of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her without her consent was an unmistakable manifestation of his intention to violate laws that specifically prohibited sexual harassment in the work environment. Assuming arguendo that respondent never intended to violate RA 7877, his attempt to kiss petitioner was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had existed since time immemorial – that intimate physical contact between individuals must be consensual. Respondent’s defiance of custom and lack of respect for the opposite sex were more appalling because he was a married man. Respondent’s act showed a low regard for women and disrespect for petitioner’s honor and dignity.

The CA, however, interpreted respondent’s repeated apologies to petitioner as an indication of the absence of intention on his part to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. On the contrary, such persistent attempts to make peace with petitioner indicated how well respondent was aware of the gravity of the transgression he had committed. Respondent certainly knew of the heavy penalty that awaited him if petitioner complained of his aggressive behavior, as she, in fact, did.

Furthermore, we note that this is the third time that respondent is being penalized for acts of sexual harassment. We are also alarmed by the increasing boldness in the way respondent displayed his unwelcome affection for the women of his fancy. He is a perverted predator preying on his female colleagues and subordinates. Respondent’s continued misbehavior cannot, therefore, be allowed to go unchecked.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR. G.R. No. 170491 April 4, 2007

Facts:

On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on petitioner’s power barges.

Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint dated 8 July 1996 impleading herein private respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., as additional defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co. On 18 September 1996, Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss which was subsequently denied by public respondent Judge in an Order dated 20 October 1998. Bangpai Shipping Co. likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss which was also denied by public respondent Judge in an Order issued on 24 January 2003.

Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to petitioner’s formal offer of evidence.

The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the motion to strike out filed respectively by the defendants. The record shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced the originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies by contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence (Comment to Defendant Wallem Philippines’ Objections and Motion to Strike). Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the photocopies may be admissible as evidence as the same constitutes electronic evidence as defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.

Held:

After a judicious scrutiny of the record of the case on hand, together with the rules and jurisprudence which are applicable in the premises, we have come up with a finding that the petition for certiorari filed in this case is not meritorious.

The petitioner tries to contend that the photocopies of documents offered by it are equivalent to the original documents that it sought to offer in evidence, based on the Rules on Electronic Evidence which were in force and effect since August 1, 2001. However, such a contention is devoid of merit. The pieces of documentary evidence offered by the petitioner in Civil Case CEB-18662 which were denied admission by the respondent judge do not actually constitute as electronic evidence as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence. The information therein were not received, retrieved or produced electronically. The petitioner has not adequately established that its documentary evidence were electronic evidence. it has not properly authenticated such evidence as electronic documents, assuming arguendo that they are. Lastly, the petitioner has not properly established by affidavit pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence the admissibility and evidentiary weight of said documentary evidence.

ANNA JANE D. LIHAYLIHAY vs. JUDGE ALEJANDRO T. CANDA A.M. No. MTJ-06-1659 June 18, 2009

Facts:

On 25 February 2005, Sheriff IV Camilo Bandivas (Sheriff Bandivas) of the RTC retired from the service. Lihaylihay alleged that Judge Canda asked Process Server Emmanuel Tenefrancia (Tenefrancia) of the RTC to apply for the position vacated by Sheriff Bandivas. To the dismay of Judge Canda, a certain Jesus V. Alimpolo (Alimpolo) applied for the vacated position. Judge Canda strongly opposed Alimpolo’s application.

Judge Canda was of the impression that Lihaylihay was assisting Alimpolo in his application for the position of Sheriff IV. On 5 January 2006, Judge Canda sent a text message to Lihaylihay stating, "Maayo tingali modistansya ka anang mga tawhana kay basin masabit ka, pakiusap lang ni." Taking the text message as a threat, Lihaylihay reported it to the police and requested that a blotter entry be made. On 6 January 2006, Judge Canda sent another text message stating, "For maliciously causing it to appear as threatening in the police blotter of what is otherwise a very harmless text message of appeal I consider the same as declaration of war, don’t worry you will have your owned fair share of trouble in due time."

Allegedly, Judge Canda harassed and publicly humiliated Lihaylihay when: (1) he asked her to stay away from Alimpolo, (2) when she reported the matter to the police, he took it as a "declaration of war" and warned her that she will have her "fair share of trouble in due time"; (3) indeed, three days after sending the threatening text message, he filed a complaint with Judge Tomarong accusing her of several things, asking that she be disciplined and removed from the service, and describing her as a "GRO," "undignified," a "whore," "disgusting," "repulsive," and "pakialamera"; (4) two days after filing the first complaint, he filed another complaint accusing her of violating office rules and describing her as "offensive," "demeaning," "inappropriate," a "GRO," "undignified," "repulsive," and a "whore"; (5) still unsatisfied, he had his second complaint published in the newspaper; and (6) when she published her comment in the newspaper, he filed a criminal case for libel against her.

Lihaylihay filed a complaint dated 20 January 2006 with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Canda of (1) bullying her; (2) ridiculing, humiliating, and besmirching her reputation by publishing in the newspaper the 11 January 2006 letter describing her as a GRO and a whore; (3) sending her threatening text messages; and (4) sending her indecent text messages.

Issue:

Whether or not the text messages presented as evidence suffices to convict Judge Canda for sending the petitioner threatening messages.

Held:

The charges that Judge Canda sent Lihaylihay indecent text messages and that he failed to pay the required legal fees are unsubstantiated, thus, they must be dismissed. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, the allegations in the complaint. The Court cannot rely on mere conjectures or suppositions.

However, Court finds Judge Alejandro T. Canda, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Liloy-Tampilisan, Judicial Region IX, Zamboanga del Norte, Guilty of Gross Misconduct Constituting Violations od the Code of Judicial Conduct.